What if this mom is employed by the local school-does her interest graduate from mere preference to objectively identifiable interest?
The accommodation of heterogeneous class member interests within injunctive class actions raises difficult questions. And the framers of Rule 23 did not supply intellectually satisfying answers. 7 Rule 23(b)(2) was intended by the framers as a powerful legal tool for effectuating racial desegregation in the face of southern intransigence. But it is a misconception that the paradigmatic (b)(2) civil rights cases and their pre-1966 forebears comprised homogeneous classes with unitary interests. On the contrary, intra-class conflicts abounded. 8 But as Professor David Marcus has explained, the nobility of the civil rights project led the progressive 1966 framers and a generation of courts to sweep those intra-class differences aside in the service of a greater good. 9 We indulge a fiction-a convenient one to the framers of Rule 23-when we justify the trans-substantive mandatory class action by reference to a "presumption of cohesiveness."
10 That justification runs counter to the historical record, which instead points to a benevolent paternalism that knowingly ignored divergent class member preferences in the service of a greater good.
The residue of indulging a fiction is fog. We are left with no coherent trans-substantive justification for a radical majoritarian device that allows minority interests in litigation to be steamrolled. The civil rights paternalism that accounts for Rule 23(b)(2) ill fits the contemporary injunctive class action, where entrepreneurial counsel bring mandatory class actions "with increasing frequency in employment, antitrust, environmental, [] securities, and other types of class litigation." 11 The moral clarity of the civil rights cases moved the framers of (b)(2) to sweep the problem of divergent class-member preferences under the rug. But moral clarity is not a workable principle. Gestalt judgments as to the greater good are unsatisfying answers to sophisticated class members who question why their interests may be ignored.
7. 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1768, at 389-93 (3d ed. 2005) (observing that the framers did not address the "difficult" question of the "level of antagonism or conflict that should preclude class certification").
8. See infra text accompanying notes 64-81 (describing intra-class conflicts in school teacher assignment and busing cases).
9. See Marcus, Flawed, supra note 1, at 661 ("the 1966 authors [of Rule 23(b)(2)] drafted a provision that could help judges ignore or bury . . . conflicts" of interest among class members in desegregation cases).
10. Id. at 664.
HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 62-66 (2003) (citations omitted).
Many courts have been dismissive of objections founded on heterogeneous class member preferences and interests, relying upon a "presumption of cohesiveness" derived from the supposedly friction-free civil rights cases. Other courts have refused to certify classes in the face of conflicting class member preferences, balking at a disunity that they suppose-quite wrongly-was absent in the paradigmatic civil rights cases that spawned Rule 23(b)(2).
12 But either way-whether they are pointing to the desegregation cases to justify a presumption of class member harmony supporting certification, or conversely as hard-to-attain ideals of harmony that justify the rejection of (b)(2) classes-courts generally appear blinded by the civil rights paradigm. Reasoned analysis is in short supply. Aphorisms about the nature of "group rights" and the "indivisible nature of the injunctive remedy" are abundant. 13 The lack of a principled framework for addressing heterogeneous class member preferences in the context of a mandatory class settlement under Rule 23(b)(2) has injected chaos into some of the most economically significant class actions in U.S. history. Most prominently, in In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation ("MDL 1720"), 14 the Second Circuit in June 2016 overturned an antitrust class action settlement that would have reformed credit card industry rules and delivered a record $7.2 billion to merchant class members. Objecting merchants-large retailers accounting for roughly 20% of U.S. transaction volume-argued that the requisite cohesiveness was lacking to certify a settlement class under Rule 23(b)(2) because, they alleged, the injunctive deal foreclosed their ability to seek different and preferable injunctive relief terms. 15 The proponents of the settlement countered that the injunctive rules changes would necessarily affect all class members, arguing that the only thing "required to proceed as a (b)(2) class is that 'the relief sought must perforce affect the entire class.'" Faced with this fundamental dispute regarding the extent to which Rule 23(b)(2) may accommodate heterogeneous class member interests, the Second Circuit punted. The appellate panel rejected the settlement on the grounds that merchants who would have no interest in damages for past harms-principally, merchants who do not yet exist-were inadequately represented by class counsel who negotiated both the damages settlement and the injunctive terms. 17 Only separate counsel for the injunctive class, as distinct from the damages class, could ensure procedural fairness to merchants who are interested in injunctive relief but not damages, according to the Second Circuit's ruling. 18 The Second Circuit's myopic focus on the relatively trivial issue of future merchants appears designed to shoehorn the case into the comfortable parameters of Amchem Prods., Inc. v 20 rather than grapple with the difficult issues posed by conflicting class member preferences. Still, one supposes, a renewed settlement will soon enough spawn all the same arguments from the large objectors that their interests are being steamrolled by a mandatory class. And at that point, the MDL 1720 court will presumably confront headlong the legal fog that has shrouded Rule 23(b)(2) since its 1966 inception. Perhaps it will address the question of just when, if ever, the disunity of class member preferences might exceed what Rule 23(b)(2) can bear. 21 In prior work, we have previously described the "tyranny paradox." 22 Where courts allow a broad heterogeneity of preferences to exist within a mandatory class, objectors will complain of a tyranny of the majority. 23 But where a court tolerates relatively less heterogeneity, insisting upon a unity of class member interests, it sanctions a tyranny of the minority where "a holdout, gadfly, or other outlier can deprive all class members of important relief to which they are entitled, and that they would be unable to obtain in the absence of the class device." 24 17. Merchant Discount, 827 F.3d at 231-34. 18. Id. at 234. ("Unitary representation of separate classes that claim distinct, competing, and conflicting relief create unacceptable incentives for counsel to trade benefits to one class for benefits to the other in order somehow to reach a settlement.").
19. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 20. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 21. 827 F.3d at 234 ("We do not decide whether providing [(b)(2)] class members with opt-out rights would be a sufficient 'structural assurance of fair and adequate representation' . . . to overcome the lack of separate class counsel and representative.") (internal citations omitted).
22. Gilles, supra note 2, at 1011. 23. Id. at 1011-13. 24. Id. at 1012.
There are no simple answers to the tyranny paradox. Distinguishing between the "mere preferences" of dissenting class members, on the one hand, and positions located in "objective" or "structural" member attributes only gets us so far. To be sure, there are cases where class member interests are clearly structural and potentially antithetical to the interests of class counsel, and those cases are tidily addressed under current adequacy of representation doctrine. But once the structural conflicts are accounted for, what then? How should we deal with conflicting class member preferences?
One answer, in theory, would be to alter the rule. But whether there is a compelling case for reform poses a question for a different day. Any such letter to the Advisory Committee is beyond the scope of this modest essay.
If instead the question is how courts should deal with heterogeneity of class member preferences, we believe the answer is rooted in the text and history of Rule 23. As a matter of positive law-of describing what the law is-Rule 23 does take a side on the tyranny paradox. It sides with the tyranny of the majority. Neither the adequacy of representation requirement of (a)(4) nor the judicially grafted "cohesiveness" requirement provides a check on the radical majoritarianism that is coded into the DNA of Rule 23. Of course, there are potential checks against majoritarian overreach, including the fairness requirement of Rule 23(e)(2), or permitting limited injunctive opt-out rights that would not destroy the efficacy of the class relief, but may provide a valve that releases the pressure of the competing tyrannies. This brief essay does not purport to propose a definitive framework for answering the difficult questions posed by the radical majoritarianism of Rule 23(b)(2). Our goal, rather, is to promote a serious examination of mandatory class actions in contemporary practice.
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP OF RULE 23(B)(2)
As framed in 1966, the new Rule 23 has been most celebrated for its invention of the Rule 23(b)(3) damages class action-a heady innovation that was carefully designed to preserve individual autonomy and property rights in the face of collectivization, principally by providing notice and opt-out rights in section (c)(2)(B). 25 But the opt-out damages class was only part of the story. The new rule also built upon existing equity practice allowing for class cases seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, in sections 23(b)(2) and (c)(2)(A).
26
If the brand new procedures of Rule 23(b)(3) were the product of cool intellectual calculation, the newly framed Rule 23(b)(2) came from the heart. The 1966 framers-progressive-minded lawyers, scholars, and judges, for the most part-conceived (b)(2) as a potent tool for combating segregation. Nothing was more pressing to these men than cementing the ability of civil rights plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief aimed at desegregating institutions and dismantling Jim Crow policies across the South. 27 As Professor David Marcus has shown, it is difficult to overstate the extent to which desegregation cases were on the minds of the framers in crafting (b)(2).
28
In fact, the abundant record of contemporaneous correspondence surrounding the drafting of Rule 23 apparently contains no evidence at all that any consideration was given to how Rule 23(b)(2) would function outside of the desegregation context. 29 And the evidence suggests the framers believed that, inside the desegregation context, substantial departure from traditional doctrinal principles was justified to achieve the ends of social justice.
The traditional rule in equity, and the practice under the 1938 rules of procedure, was that a "true" class action would be entitled to res judicata effect only if the interests and preferences of the class members were perfectly harmonious. 30 As Marcus explains, the rule "prohibited 27. See Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (observing that Rule 23(b)(2) "reflects a series of decisions involving challenges to racial discrimination"); see also Marcus, Flawed, supra note 1, at 661 ("Rule 23(b)(2)'s champions ardently supported litigation-driven integration, and they believed class treatment of equal protection claims essential to its success.").
28. Marcus, Flawed, supra note 1, at 703 n.269 (reporting that Kaplan's short-hand for (b)(2) class suits was "the segregation cases," and that other members of the committee referred to this provision as "the integration section").
29. According to committee member John Frank, "the race relations echo of that decade was always in the committee room. If there was [a] single, undoubted goal of the committee, the energizing force which motivated the whole rule, it was the firm determination to create a class action system which could deal with civil rights, and explicitly, segregation. The one part of the rule which was never doubted was (b)(2) and without its high utility, in the spirit of the times, we might well have had no rule at all." John P. The early civil rights cases had little trouble negotiating this procedural terrain. Typically, in the period preceding Brown v. Board of Education, these cases sought edicts that a particular institution abolish a specific discriminatory policy-e.g., the de jure policy of a state law school excluding black students. 34 The pre-Brown cases did not typically judgment and precluded future litigation only when the class was strongly unified outside the lawsuit."); Bone, supra note 5, at 669 (describing one of the categories created by the 1938 Rule as the "so-called 'true class action,'" where "the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is joint, or common, or secondary" In each of these cases, the Supreme Court held that blacks had been denied rights to equal education in violation of the 14th Amendment, and ordered schools to provide them these benefits. Typically, states responded to these decisions by establishing short-lived black-only schools rather than integrate existing institutions. See, e.g., Mary implicate heterogeneous class member preferences, and it is not hard to see why. No black student was forced to apply to law school, after all. The original Brown case was in the same mold. The class plaintiffs sought a simple injunction against the operation of a discriminatory policy. 35 It seemed reasonably safe to assume class member preferences in favor of such an order were harmonious.
But the segregationist backlash to Brown ushered in the complexities of the modern era. As Professor Marcus explains, crafty southern legislators sought to neuter Brown by enacting state laws under which each pupil was "individually" assigned to a specific school. 36 Although these "pupil placement" regimes theoretically permitted intrepid individual black students to brave otherwise all-white schools on their own-by challenging their assignments under an administrative procedure and then possibly in court, under Brown-these challenges would presumably be rare. 37 More importantly, the new regime would insulate the school districts from broad class-wide challenges to their fit to open one for blacks. Consequently, the Oklahoma Board of Regents quickly assigned three white law professors to instruct Sipuel in several roped-off rooms in the state capitol, while it hurriedly began to implement steps to establish a law school for black students at Langston. When Sipuel returned to court to complain that the creation of a one-student, overnight special law school with totally inadequate facilities was an act of defiance of the Court's mandate, the Court announced that the issue of equality of facilities was not properly before it and upheld the right of the State of Oklahoma to create a separate law school for black students. The new law school at Langston was in operation for eighteen months, during which time only one student attended. After the black school closed in 1949, Sipuel was admitted to the University of Oklahoma Law School from which she graduated in 1951.") (internal citations omitted). Another example is found in cases challenging the policies of various school districts' in paying black teachers less than white teachers for the same work. See placement laws thus supplied the ostensibly non-racial basis upon which conventionally segregated outcomes in school assignments might be preserved. Additionally, most placement laws specified administrative remedies for parents of students dissatisfied with the school board's initial decision. The grievance procedures further insulated discriminatory treatment from constitutional scrutiny for two reasons. First, drawing out the lengthy appeals process meant that it could take years to exhaust local administrative remedies as required to gain a hearing in federal courts. Second, making the process sufficiently daunting discouraged parents from challenging their school assignments.").
repackaged Jim Crow policies. 38 In Briggs v. Elliott, Judge John J. Parker, the segregationists' leading legal light, narrowly interpreted Brown to mean only that schools may not discriminate-and not that they must affirmatively take steps to integrate. 39 Relying on Briggs, courts across the South upheld the new pupil placement laws. 40 A pupil who could show discrimination in her placement, they held, would be entitled to relief as to herself alone. The harm was the discriminatory decision made on her placement; it was incurred at the individual level, not the group level. There was, then, clearly no warrant for class relief. 41 Integrationists on the bench and elsewhere grew frustrated as pupil placement and similar regimes met with considerable success in protecting Jim Crow segregation against court challenge into the early 1960s.
42
Professor Marcus makes the compelling case that, as a consequence of this frustration, leading circuit court judges began to read Brown in a way they had not before. 43 [A] ll that it has decided, is that a state may not deny to any person on account of race the right to attend any school that it maintains." Id. This holding "provided invaluable legal cover to recalcitrant southern officials as they fought to maintain Jim Crow after Brown." Marcus, Flawed, supra note 1, at 683.
40. Golub, supra note 37, at 509 ("On Parker's interpretation of Brown, the constitutional prohibition against segregated schools is satisfied by a transition to facially neutral placement criteria or 'freedom of choice' plans, even when doing so results in school attendance patterns indistinguishable from those under Jim Crow. Racial separation itself need not change, only the stated justification for segregation and the techniques by which it is accomplished").
41. See Marcus, Flawed, supra note 1, at 688 ("Individual black students choosing one-by-one to attend white schools, however, would never disassemble the segregation edifice").
42. John Minor Wisdom rejected what he slyly termed the "Briggs dictum" that the Constitution does not require integration but merely forbids segregation-a conception that, Wisdom complained, made it impossible to maintain "class actions suits to desegregate a school system." 44 In the wake of this landmark decision, the Fifth Circuit and others began to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment does demand integration, requiring school boards "to achieve integrated schools by mixing groups of black and white students together." 45 No longer was the actionable harm of discrimination located at the individual pupil level, as under the pupil placement regimes. 46 Instead, under Jefferson County and other circuit cases, courts held the actionable harm under Brown is to the group: "Briggs overlooks the fact that Negroes collectively are harmed when the state, by law or custom, operates segregated schools," Judge Wisdom wrote.
47 "Although the effects of discrimination are felt by each member of the group, and discriminatory practice is directed against the group as a unit and against individuals only as their connection with the group involves the antigroup sanction.
[As] a group-wrong, the mode of redress must be group-wide to be adequate." that "Brigg's focus on the individual nature of Fourteenth Amendment rights was inconsistent with Brown II's explicit recognition of the right of blacks as a class to a unitary, nonracial system of public education. By requiring states only to provide relief to discrete individuals, the opinion in Briggs permitted, and even encouraged, the perpetuation of a dual, segregated system because it failed to address, let alone cure, the systemic constitutional wrong of legally mandated educational apartheid"); id. ("Wisdom insisted, because the evil perpetrated by de jure segregation was an injury to an entire race, any meaningful, constitutionally appropriate remedy had to address that class-wide wrong.").
The courts' recognition of an affirmative state duty to achieve integration was surely a momentous development in substantive civil rights law. 49 But it also had a profound, if less obvious, effect on class action procedure. The traditional equity rule requiring homogeneous class member preferences had been unproblematic when courts were striking down, say, a municipal rule precluding blacks from using certain city parks. But it would be unreasonable to expect unanimity-or anything like it-when shuffling the school assignments of all pupils in the Fort Worth School District, 50 or busing Memphis pupils out of their home neighborhoods.
51
Working at the zenith of the civil rights movement, the drafters of Rule 23 understood that the percolating flood of integration cases for which they designed Rule 23(b)(2) would not satisfy the traditional requirement of perfectly harmonious class member preferences.
52 But they also understood, as Professor Marcus has shown, that "the effective vindication of Fourteenth Amendment rights required systemic integration, or the treatment of black students as groups regardless of their individual preferences."
53 Chief drafter Ben Kaplan thus resisted proposals to import from equity the perfect harmony standard for 49. Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). The Supreme Court applied Wisdom's reasoning in Jefferson County on a nationwide basis, holding that school boards were "clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (demonstrating that the Court continued course, stating that it would "correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, the condition that offends the Constitution").
50. See, e.g., Flax v. Potts, 915 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1990 ) (decades-long desegregation case involving the Fort Worth Independent School District which entailed, among other things, reassignment of students and faculty, extensive cross-town busing, the implementation of a majorityto-minority transfer policy, and the building of new magnet schools).
51. See, e.g., Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., 302 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1962 ). Memphis schools remained deeply segregated into the 1970s, when the district judge finally ordered a new plan for cross-town busing of almost 40,000 students-which led to the withdrawal of 29,000 students from the Memphis school system. Daniel Kiel, , dissenting) (describing potential class conflicts in desegregation cases: "it is not impossible that after authorizing action in his behalf, a Negro parent, concerned that a continued frontal attack could result in schools closed for years, might prefer to wait with his fellows a longer time for good-faith efforts by the local school board than is permitted by the centrally determined policy of the NAACP. Or he might see a greater prospect of success through discussions with local school authorities than through the litigation deemed necessary by the between an immediate small gain and possible later achievement of a larger aim should at least be put to the plaintiff in whose name the suit was being brought, not decided for him by third parties.").
53. Marcus, Flawed, supra note 1, at 710.
injunctive cases, and he and Wright likewise eschewed any requirement that the relief must be indivisible, 54 having learned from the pupil placement regimes and Briggs just how readily an indivisibility requirement could be gamed. 55 Reasonably enough, the framers evidently believed there was no satisfactory basis for prescribing the level of disunity among class member preferences that a (b)(2) class may accommodate-not without jeopardizing the civil rights class cases that were their focus. 56 And they apparently regarded that the objective sought in those cases was so clearly correct, so overwhelmingly important, that steamrolling some measure of dissent was a price worth paying. 57 In all events, the final 54. Committee member John P. Frank expressly proposed to limit mandatory class treatment to cases where "the practical effect of the relief granted . . . is to make it impossible or impractical to litigate the matter further[]"-i.e., to cases involving a "unitary course of action in which there is no divisibility." Id. at 700 (alteration in original) (quoting Undated Memorandum from John P. Frank to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor, at 9, microformed on CIS-6310-17 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.)). Kaplan rejected this "indivisibility metric" Marcus has explained, because it would have excluded "race relations cases." Id. at 700 n. 249. 55. Id. at 706. Kaplan and Charles Alan Wright were likewise unpersuaded by the suggestion of Committee member J.P. Frank to leave (b)(2) out of the rule altogether and instead leave the certification of civil rights classes to section (b)(1)(A), on the theory that a defendant would be subjected to "incompatible standards" if a court were to hold "that a school should be segregated as to one applicant but not as to another." Id. Wright predicted that segregationist courts and recalcitrant schools would have a field day with such a doctrine, noting a recent decision where a "decree was entered providing the bus company must transport the three named plaintiffs without discrimination, but it could . . . refuse all other Negroes." See Marcus, Flawed, supra note 1, at 706 (alteration in original) (quoting Transcript of Session on Class Actions 13 (Oct. 31, 1963-Nov. 2, 1963), microformed on CIS-7104-53 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.).
56. Id. at 699 (observing that "neither in the extensive memoranda he drafted to lay the legal basis for the new rule nor in any other surviving documentation of his efforts did Kaplan explain why this intrinsic harmony existed in injunctive relief cases"); id. at 709 (noting that the 1966 drafters "gave no explanation . . . for why an injunctive relief class judgment could bind absent class members with possibly divergent preferences . . .").
57. Members of the advisory committee were not alone in disregarding potential conflict among putative class members. As Derrick Bell recounts in this emblematic story, leading civil rights groups also discounted community preferences that clashed with the goal of full integration:
I was visited by a small group of parents and leaders of the black community [who] needed legal help because the school board had closed the black elementary school in their area even though the school had been built during the 1930's with private funds and was maintained, in part, by the efforts of the black community. Closing of the school necessitated busing black children across the county to another black school. In addition, the community had lost the benefit of the school for a meeting place and community center. The group wanted to sue the school board to have their school reopened. I recall informing the group that both LDF and NAACP had abandoned efforts to make separate schools equal, but if they wished to desegregate the whole school system, we could probably provide legal assistance. The group recognized as well as I did that there were only a few black attorneys in Mississippi who would represent the group, and that those attorneys would represent them only if a civil rights organization provided financial support. Sometime later, the group contacted me and indicated they were ready to go ahead with a school desegregation suit. It was filed in 1963, one of the first in the state.
text of (b)(2) provided no limiting principle to account for divergent class member preferences regarding injunctive remedies. As written, (b)(2) provides only that the challenged conduct of the defendant must "apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief. . . is appropriate respecting the class as a whole." 58 This text can plainly be satisfied in cases where some class members (or even a great many) would prefer (or even greatly prefer) to pursue different (or even opposed) injunctive strategies, or where dissenting class members would prefer to reject proposed settlement terms altogether and preserve individual rights to sue.
In the end, the framers took comfort in the expectation that class member dissent inside the civil rights cases would be rare and muted. In fact, when asked whether he could "imagine including in [a Rule 23(b)(2)] class somebody who specifically objects," chief drafter Ben Kaplan simply answered that he did not "think the cases typically arising under [the provision] would present that problem at all."
59 Kaplan and his colleagues thus rejected all bids to supply a limiting principle to account for divergent member preferences.
60
Of course, all of this history would be of relatively narrow interest but for the fact that the framers of Rule 23 were insistent that the new rule (b)(2) must provide a trans-substantive rule of civil procedure. This was not obvious or uncontroversial at the time. Committee member John P. Frank, a prominent practitioner, was extremely concerned that the new rule marked an unprecedented intrusion on litigant (or class member) autonomy. When Kaplan nixed the idea of extending opt-out rights to (b)(2) cases, Frank (who was personally quite liberal and had handled important civil rights cases) argued for limiting the reach of (b)(2) to the "race relations" cases. 61 Needless to say, this proposal went nowhere, and the final Advisory Committee notes are explicit that "Subdivision (b)(2) is not limited to civil-rights cases." 62 In the end, Marcus tells us,
The Leake County incident was unusual at that time because, in most instances, civil rights lawyers advised black parents of their rights under Brown in situations where there was little or no discussion of alternatives to integration. . . . My view then was that a federal suit designed simply to reopen a segregated black school, even if successful, would constitute far less than the full realization of rights to which these parents were entitled under Brown. For Frank and his progressive brethren, the political imperative of desegregation demanded that any potential intra-class conflicts be swept aside in the service of a greater good.
II. DISPARATE CLASS-MEMBER PREFERENCES UNDER RULE 23(B)(2)
In the years following the 1966 inception of Rule 23, courts applied (b)(2) to increasingly complex civil rights issues and institutional reform cases-and, relatedly, to cases that featured ever greater disunity of class member preferences. 64 For example, beginning in the late 1960s and continuing for decades, courts grappled with class action remedies designed to integrate the faculties and staffs of public schools. 65 These cases generated tremendous difficulties and implicated hugely divergent class member interests. 66 Many black teachers in historically segregated districts were absolutely mortified at the prospect of teaching white students. 67 Others were put to great hardship in having to travel from their home school zones.
68
But the injuries wrought by the school districts' discriminatory policies were common to the class in each case, and the injunctions affected each class as a whole. Widely divergent class member preferences, then, were no bar to the certification of 63. Marcus, Flawed, supra note 1 at 702 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). 64. As Deborah Rhode notes, "schisms" between class members commonly "surface during settlement or remedial deliberations." Deborah Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 REV. , 1188 REV. (1982 . Class members may have been in general agreement about the harm, but lack "a shared conviction about the appropriate remedy." Id. at 1189. "However, once it becomes clear that some relief will be forthcoming, factions emerge." Id.
65 School busing cases presented the same issues. In 1970's Boston, for example, violent clashes over court-ordered busing plans quickly exposed fissures among members of the black community over the goals of desegregation litigation. 71 Derrick Bell recounted that, while some class members remained fully committed to the ideal of "total desegregation," others grew deeply "ambivalent about the busing plans" and sought instead to upgrade existing black schools to improve educational opportunities and retain minority control.
72
Across the country-in San Francisco, 73 Detroit, 74 Atlanta, 75 and Dallas 76 -classmember opposition to remedial busing plans emerged and grew more forceful over time. And while some civil rights lawyers acknowledged these splintering interests, most were fearful (just as the drafters of (b)(2) had been) that surrendering to claims of individualized student 72. Bell, supra note 57 at 482-89 (describing the varied interests and positions on school desegregation and busing within the black community); see also Rhode, supra note 64, at 1189 ("Constituencies that support integration in principle have disputed its value in particular settings where extended bus rides, racial tension, or white flight seem likely concomitants of judicial redistricting. Some minority administrators, teachers, and parental organizations have opposed interdistrict remedies that would close minority schools or dilute minority control.").
73. 79 emblematic of the era, the Supreme Court upheld a plan to integrate Denver area schools by various means, including long-distance, cross-town busing. In dissent, Justice Powell fretted that, "[i]n the commendable national concern for alleviating public school segregation, courts may have overlooked the fact that the rights and interests of children affected by a desegregation program also are entitled to consideration." 80 For Justice Powell, missing from the Court's analysis was any consideration of the individualized preferences of black students-for example, some wished not to be "on a bus for a substantial part of the day," or expose themselves to the "genuine element of danger" of attending a faraway, all-white school. 81 Nor did the Court reflect upon, in Justice Powell's view, the desire among some black parents that their "children attend community schools near home" and receive instruction by black teachers who would serve as models of achievement. 82 It is telling that the basis for Justice Powell's dissent, as well as the separate dissent of Justice Rehnquist, had nothing to do with Rule 23-77. Bell, supra note 57, at 492 n.64 (quoting NAACP General Counsel Nathaniel Jones: "It would be absurd to expect that each and every black person should be polled before a lawsuit is filed, or a plan of desegregation is proposed. Certainly, school boards, who resist these suits, do not poll their patrons on their views before shaping a position").
78. Id. at 492. Bell continues: This position represents an extraordinary view of the lawyer's role. Not only does it assume a perpetual retainer authorizing a lifelong effort to obtain racially balanced schools. It also fails to reflect any significant change in representational policy from a decade ago, when virtually all blacks assumed that integration was the best means of achieving a quality education for black children, to the present time, when many black parents are disenchanted with the educational results of integration. Id. See also Rhode, supra note 64, at 1211 (discussing civil rights attorneys focus on "maximum integration . . . [that] led them to ignore a shift in priorities among many black parents from racial balance to quality education").
79 after all, the Rule makes no provision for denying class treatment based on heterogeneous preferences. Instead, the dissenters would have restored something akin to the substantive civil rights law doctrine of Briggs, rejecting any basis for affirmative decrees mandating particular levels of pupil integration (and, in the process, obviating any question of divergent class member preferences).
83
Most explicit was Justice Rehnquist's dissent, channeling Judge Parker's distinction between desegregation and integration:
To require that a genuinely 'dual' system be disestablished, in the sense that the assignment of a child to a particular school is not made to depend on his race is one thing. To require that school boards affirmatively undertake to achieve racial mixing in schools [. . .] is quite obviously something else. 84 Throughout, the courts' unflinching application of Rule 23(b)(2) to complex civil rights cases implicating heterogeneous class member preferences was faithful to the intent behind the rule. In drafting (b)(2), the framers had eschewed limitations upon the degree of permissible disunity in class member preferences. And so, courts confronting the complex civil rights cases of the 1970s and beyond had little trouble applying the rule as written. If the preferences of some teachers, students or families got steamrolled by class injunctions in the teacher integration and busing cases, that was just the inevitable result of the rule. 85 Over the past several decades, of course, the substantive context of Rule 23(b)(2) cases has broadened, moving beyond the initial focus on desegregation and into a wider realm of consumer, antitrust, employment and other cases. 86 In part, this expansion has tracked the spread of legal 83. Id. at 250-51 ("There is nothing in the Constitution, its history, or-until recently-in the jurisprudence of this Court that mandates the employment of forced transportation of young and teenage children to achieve a single interest, as important as that interest may be.").
84. Id. at 258. 85. Class conflicts were generally ignored in other (b)(2) contexts as well. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 64, at 1190 (offering examples of "comparable cleaves" among class members in other institutional reform contexts, such as cases seeking to enjoin unlawful employment discrimination, unconstitutional prison conditions, and discriminatory disability policies).
86. See Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3rd 48, 59 (3d Cir. 1994) (observing that while the (b)(2) class may have been "designed specifically for civil rights cases seeking broad declaratory or injunctive relief for a numerous and often unascertainable or amorphous class of persons" it is now employed in a variety of non-civil rights contexts, including consumer, antitrust, employment, and toxic harm classes) (quoting NEWBERG AND CONTE § 4.11, at 4-39); see also Linda S. activism outward, from its civil rights core, into other settings. 87 But equally, in our view, the expansion has been a byproduct of the advent of entrepreneurial class action lawyers, 88 profit-seeking actors for whom injunctive relief and the threat of injunctive relief are useful tools-both to lend a sort of social-justice sheen to their actions (and this is not a cynical point: the social-justice wrapping of entrepreneurial litigation often benefits class members in courts and public opinion) and to lever greater monetary compensation for class members and counsel. Class actions in the employment, consumer and antitrust areas routinely feature claims for injunctive relief running alongside claims for damages, and they routinely settle for substantial damages and insubstantial injunctive relief. 89 All these developments-plus the fact that class action settlements, nowadays, feature broad and carefully negotiated releases 90 -put pressure on a mandatory class action device that was not built to give vent to the interests of dissenting class members. For one, the sheer sprawl of class practice into complex areas, like antitrust cases with the potential to reform entire industries, virtually ensured that the heterogeneity of class member preferences would be amplified. 91 And for another, the deployment of the double-barreled injunctive-anddamages class device in the hands of entrepreneurial lawyers virtually ensured greater steamrolling of dissenter interests and preferences. 92 The steamroller was always there-we saw that in the civil rights cases of the 1970s, for instance-but now there was a powerful engine attached to it: ' an end to litigation on the matter," which is secured by broad releases against future litigation.).
91. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 2, at 1020-21 (describing proposed injunctive settlements in contemporary, complex cases that promise "substantial benefit[s] for a strong majority of class members, but that a minority . . . oppose[] on the ground that they could do better for themselves if left to pursue their own individual injunctive claims").
92. See Mullenix, supra note 86, at 217 ("[T]he mandatory nature of the 23(b)(2) part of the class could serve as a bar to the pursuit of future claims, which preclusive effect might not be ameliorated by the 23(b)(3) presence of an opt-out right.").
the drive to maximize class member compensation (and, of course, attorneys' fees as well).
But through all these developments, the doctrinal architecture of Rule 23(b)(2) has remained unscathed. The radical majoritarianism that lies at the heart of the mandatory class action stands unbent by 50 years of practice.
To be sure, there have been significant doctrinal developments under Rule 23(b)(2) over the years, but none that directly implicate the issue of warring class member preferences. Most significant was the rise and fall of the so-called "hybrid" class action, where plaintiffs (mostly in employment cases) sought to certify classes under (b)(2) for both traditional injunctive relief and some "incidental" form of monetary relief styled to appear as an equitable remedy-e.g., back-pay under Title VII, or restitution or disgorgement. 93 Before they were rendered extinct by Wal-mart v. Dukes, 94 the hybrid cases raised the issue of whether (b)(2) might permit opt-out procedures. 95 Because the hybrids implicated individual claims for money (however those claims might be denominated), several pre-Dukes courts held that individual class members must, as a matter of due process, have the option to request exclusion from the (b)(2) class. 96 Importantly, it appears that nearly every case approving (b)(2) opt-outs has implicated individual monetary interests. 97 The other noteworthy doctrinal development under (b)(2) has been the judicial grafting of a "cohesiveness" requirement onto the text of the rule. The cohesiveness requirement imports into (b)(2) the superiority and manageability requirements of 23(b)(3)-and arguably predominance as well. 98 The key point is that the cohesiveness requirement provides a bulwark against the litigation of individual issues in a (b)(2) class. "Rule 23(b)(2)," in other words, "includes an implicit 'cohesiveness' requirement, which precludes certification when individual issues abound."
99 Manageability is the concern. Here again, as with the issue of opt-outs in hybrid cases, the doctrinal development does not purport to address the problem of how to treat conflicting class member preferences.
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For the party seeking to argue that its litigation preferences are unfairly impinged by a mandatory class action, the cases affirming a (b) (2) (clarifying that "absent sufficient cohesiveness, actions would inevitably become so unmanageable that the primary purpose of the class action device-i.e., advancing judicial economy and efficiency through class-wide treatment-would be destroyed").
100. Burch, supra note 6, at 982 (2010) ("Because (b)(2) class actions do not require opt-out opportunities, assuming cohesion allays judges' qualms about due-process concerns such as personal notice and the ability to exit . . . . Consequently, [courts] presum[e] that class members' interests are cohesive, even when that presumption is fictitious.").
opt-out right present a sort of fool's gold: they glitter, but fail to deliver any analytic value. An extra-statutory "cohesiveness" requirement is a tempting place for class objectors to look for protections against majoritarian overreach. But as we have discussed, cohesiveness is really just shorthand for manageability. And hybrid cases like Eubanks v. Billington provide tempting bases on which to argue that courts may broadly allow opt-outs from (b)(2) classes. 101 But those cases only ever allowed opt-outs to seek monetary relief-a doctrinal stream that has been fully dammed by Dukes. Still, we should expect to hear these arguments from (b)(2) class members who complain that their interests are being ignored by class settlements. And indeed, these arguments were front and center in the recent payment card cases, as we will discuss in Part III.
Finally, what about the doctrinal developments under the adequate representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4)? Doesn't that robust body of law provide a basis for addressing warring class member preferences? Here again, the answer is no.
In Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, the Court held that adequate representation was lacking where the class representatives, who had all been injured by exposure to asbestos, entered a settlement agreement that prejudiced the interests of future claimants, for whom asbestos-related injuries had not yet manifested. 102 The conflict, according to the Court, was acute: "[f]or the currently injured, the critical goal is generous immediate payments. That goal tugs against the interest of exposureonly plaintiffs in ensuring an ample, inflation-protected fund for the future." (1997) . The conflicts in Amchem were significant. Most prominently, the plaintiffs' attorneys were representatives of individuals claiming current injury, but because defendants would not settle without a guarantee against future claims, counsel "endeavored to represent the interests of the anticipated future claimants, although those lawyers then had no attorney-client relationship with such claimants." Id. at 601. Further, the nine named plaintiffs all claimed existing injury, no subclasses were created, and the proposed settlement provided a payment schedule for different types of asbestos-related disease with no adjustment for inflation. Finally, numerous claims-such as fear of future harm and medical monitoring, as well as all punitive damages-were released in the settlement. Id. at 602-04.
103. Id. at 626. 104. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION, section 2.07(a)(1) (2010) ("(a) As necessary conditions to the aggregate treatment of related claims by way of a class action, the court differences between the already-injured members' interests and the interests of the future claimants are "structural," in the sense that they are objectively determined; they are functions of how the class members are situated. These differences arise from objective, ex ante-observable distinctions, and not from any idiosyncratic strategies or preferences. 105 Accordingly, post-Amchem courts faced with adequacy challenges seek to "ferret out" "whether there are 'structural' conflicts within a proposed class that make it improper for class counsel to represent them all."
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No doubt, the divide between structural conflicts, on the one hand, and conflicting preferences, on the other, is porous at the margin. 107 One could argue that preferences themselves are the product of objectively determinable interests, as processed by experience. But in practice, the distinction has not proven difficult for courts to apply. 108 It does not appear, in fact, that the concept of "structural conflict" has strayed far beyond the paradigm of the future claimant. context of settlements that differentially affect future claimants, courts have generally declined to find (a)(4) conflicts from the fact that "representative plaintiffs derive less utility from protections for future claims than those who have only future claims." 110 In the absence of a disabling structural conflict, the fact that "not all members of the class may seek or desire the same relief, or may otherwise have disparate interests, will not render a class definition overly broad or defective or bar the certifying of a class action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief." 111 So where does that leave us? Our thesis is that the framers of Rule 23, operating out of benevolent paternalism and unable to foresee the expansion of (b)(2) class action practice into the commercial realms, designed a mandatory class device that-it turns out-will tend to run roughshod over the interests of dissenting class members, unless the minority's interests are themselves a function of structural, ex anteobservable attributes. Intra-class tensions arising from this regime have predictably been amplified by the growth of contemporary entrepreneurial class action practice. High-stakes entrepreneurial cases with the capacity to produce structural reform bring the radical conditions case, the defendant challenged adequacy on the grounds some inmates want to be transferred to less crowded facilities, while others "may wish to remain . . . to be close to friends and family"). 110. Dewey, 681 F.3d 170, 186 (clarifying that "each class member naturally derives different amounts of utility from any class-wide settlement. An older . . . plaintiff, for example, might value a front-loaded settlement more than other members of the class. A coupon-clipping representative plaintiff may derive more utility from a coupon-based settlement than other members of the class. To hold that these differing valuations by themselves render the representative plaintiff inadequate would all but eviscerate the class action device"); Gooch, 672 F.3d at 428 ("[D]ifferently weighted interests" among class members "are not detrimental" to application for class certification "[b]ecause few people are ever identically situated;" indeed, "it is easy to paint an image of the class representative's interests as peripherally antagonistic to the class. That depiction does not make the plaintiff an inadequate representative."). (2008) (noting that the differences in the class "that matter are those that give rise to a significant potential for negotiation on behalf of an undifferentiated class to skew in some predictable way the design of class-settlement terms in favor of one or another subgroup for reasons unrelated to evaluation of the relevant claims"). majoritarian design of Rule 23(b)(2) into particularly stark relief. And no case better showcases these issues than the ongoing Payment Card Interchange litigation, which we discuss in Part III.
III. THE PAYMENT CARD INTERCHANGE CASE AND THE MANDATORY CLASS
If Payment Card Interchange did not exist, a law professor would have had to create it as a stylized vehicle for exploring the issues surrounding the mandatory class action in cases featuring heterogeneous class member interests. Among other areas, the case compels the observer to consider: (i) the limits of the adequacy of representation requirement; (ii) the application of the "cohesiveness" doctrine; (iii) the possibility of injunctive opt-out rights in injunctive cases; and (iv) the role of the Rule 23(e) fairness requirement in constraining the tyranny of the majority. We will briefly address each after providing some background.
A. Background
In Payment Card Interchange, a putative class representing all U.S. credit-card-accepting merchants brought claims against the Visa and MasterCard networks and their top member banks, alleging the swipe fees that merchants incur each time they process a card transaction are inflated by defendants' violations of the antitrust laws. In particular, the merchants challenged several of Visa and MasterCard's network rules. The first related to the rules under which the networks and their member banks centrally set the so-called "interchange rates" that determine the swipe fees each merchant pays. In the lawsuit, the merchants attacked this "Interchange Rule" as collusive price fixing.
112
Another claim challenged the "No Surcharge Rules"-the network rules that prevent merchants from passing along to their customers the swipe fees they incur-via a discrete surcharge levied on each transaction. 113 And the lawsuit challenged other network rules as well, including the "Honor All Cards Rule," which prohibits merchants from declining specific Visa or 112. Merchant Discount, 827 F.3d at 228 ("Plaintiffs allege that these Visa and MasterCard network rules, working in tandem, allow the issuing banks to impose an artificially inflated interchange fee that merchants have little choice but to accept.").
113. Id. at 229 ("The most consequential relief afforded the (b)(2) class was the ability to surcharge Visa-and MasterCard-branded credit cards at both the brand and product levels. That is, a merchant could increase the price of a good at the point of sale if a consumer presents (for example) a Visa card instead of cash, or a Visa rewards card instead of a Visa card that yields no rewards.").
MasterCard-branded cards based on the identity of the issuing bank or other features. 114 After nearly a decade of litigation, the class and the defendants reached a settlement that provided for the richest payout ever in an antitrust class action-roughly $7.25 billion in cash. 115 On the injunctive side, the deal provided for the rescission of the "No-Surcharge Rules," but did not purport to alter the Interchange "Rules or the Honor All Cards Rules." 116 And the settlement contained broad release terms, under which merchants would release their claims under all three rules. 117 The settlement provided for separate-but-overlapping classes under both Rule 23(b)(3), for damages, and (b)(2), a mandatory class for injunctive relief. A merchant electing to opt out of the (b)(3) class to seek individual damages would still be bound to the terms of the (b)(2) release, and would of course still get the benefits of the injunctive relief. 118 The settlement was a controversial one. Objecting merchants launched a nationwide "Stop The Settlement" campaign in industry and media channels. In all, several thousand merchants, and many of the largest U.S. merchants, signed on to one or more of the filed objections, representing 19% of U.S. card transaction volume in the aggregate. 119 The objectors' primary complaint was with the injunctive relief providing the ability to impose credit card surcharges. For these class members, this injunctive relief was not sufficiently valuable to justify providing a broad release, under which the defendants would remain free to maintain their Interchange and Honor All Cards Rules. 120 In short, the nub of the attack on the settlement was the warring preferences of class members.
B. Adequacy of Representation
In the Payment Card Interchange settlement, the district court approved a dual-class structure consisting of a (b)(3) damages class and a mandatory (b)(2) injunctive class, with one set of lawyers representing all class members.
121 Dual-class structures of this sort have become commonplace in cases seeking both damages and injunctive relief-and for good reason. 122 The only alternative is to have a unitary (b)(3) class for all claims, 123 leaving class members free to opt out with their various idiosyncratic (and possibly conflicting) injunctive claims intact.
124 Such a regime would all but preclude class actions seeking both damages and injunctive relief against a defendant's across-the-board practices.
125 The dual-class structure, meanwhile, gives parties the freedom to negotiate with many variables in play-including damages, injunctive terms, and the terms of releases. Subject to the constraints of class counsel's fiduciary obligations and the substantive fairness requirement of Rule 23(e), the dual-class structure allows a defendant to condition the payment of money damages upon the receipt of an airtight release of future injunctive claims. And, in theory, the dual-class structure allows for claims and elements of relief to be traded off against one another, including damages and injunctive elements-much the same way that a they incur is that this will induce card networks to drop their interchange rates. If a network's rates are too high, in a world without no-surcharge rules, merchants are able to impose surcharges on that network's cards, incentivizing cardholders to use other cards that are not surcharged at the point of sale.
121 124. Gilles, supra note 2, at 1023 n.90 ("Indeed, courts have often granted injunctive relief in the context of Rule 23(b)(3) claims, at least when equitable and monetary damages are both sought. And when this occurs, opt-outs from the Rule 23(b)(3) class are free to seek individual injunctive relief.").
125. In fact, a dual-class structure is unavoidable-and a unitary (b)(3) is untenable-if various opt-outs might seek conflicting forms of injunctive relief against the defendant. Rule 23(b)(1)(A) provides for a mandatory class in cases where the different injunctions sought "would establish incompatible standards of conduct" for the defendant. In practice, of course, (b)(2) prevents multiple potentially conflicting injunctions whether or not the defendant can meet the demanding "would establish incompatible standards of conduct" standard.
lawyer representing an individual client might trade off claims and elements of relief in settlement negotiations.
The Second Circuit decision in Payment Card Interchange raises the question of whether this broad freedom to negotiate is a feature or a bug of the dual-class system. To the court, it was reason enough to reverse the settlement that one set of lawyers represented both the damages class under (b)(3) and the injunctive (b)(2) class and so had incentives to trade off injunctive relief for damages. 126 The membership of the two classes was largely overlapping-all operating merchants at the time of settlement had live claims for damages and injunctive relief-but the overlap was not total.
127 The (b)(3) class included merchants who had gone out of business, and the (b)(2) class would bind merchants who do not yet exist-that is, future merchants would be bound by the release and would benefit from the injunction.
128
The Second Circuit was careful to base its (a)(4) analysis on structural considerations-namely, the structure of the dual-class approach itself. The court was especially careful, in a legislative sort of way, to identify the conditions under which it will find a dual-class structure offends Rule 23(a)(4): "when the (b)(2) and (b)(3) classes do not have independent counsel, seek distinct relief, have nonoverlapping membership, and (importantly) are certified as settlementonly."
129 Of course, settlement-only certification is true in most class cases nowadays. 130 So the Second Circuit test really comes down to whether there are any non-overlapping members. If there are even a handful, the panel decision tells us, a structural conflict requires "structural protection"-specifically, division of the class into "homogenous subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4)(B), with separate representation to eliminate conflicting interests of counsel." 131 126. 827 F.3d at 233 ("[T]he unitary representation of these plaintiffs was inadequate . . . . Such conflicts and absence of incentive required a sufficient 'structural assurance of fair and adequate representation,' but none was provided.") (internal citations omitted).
127. Id. at 235 (discussing the "partial overlap of merchants" belonging to both the (b)(2) and (b)(3) classes).
128. Id. (predicting that "[o]ver time, the initial overlap will be reduced, and the gap between the interests of the (b)(3) and (b)(2) classes will continue to widen" as some merchants fail and others come into being The merits or demerits of the Payment Card Interchange decision are not our focus here.
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The point, rather, is the treatment of heterogeneous preferences-an issue that the Second Circuit decision simply defers until it is presented by a structurally homogenous class. Instead of resolving any issues of warring class-member preferences, the panel decision just creates a new issue of warring subclass-member preferences. Within the new subclass, the same issues will persist: some members will very much want the surcharging relief, while others will want to hold out for better or different terms, or just to hold on to their releases.
Suppose that, in the wake of the Second Circuit's decision, a separately represented injunctive class were to seek approval of the same injunctive relief and release terms as before. What would be the result? The decision suggests that the panel could find yet another structural conflict and, once again, require additional subclassing, and so on-as still-narrower subclasses present the same issues over and over. 133 For example, the court was sympathetic to the objectors' argument that many merchants cannot derive value from the surcharge relief, either because they are located in a state that bans credit-card surcharges by law, or because the merchant accepts American Express and is limited in its ability to surcharge under Amex rules:
132. That said, in our view, the Second Circuit's ruling clearly suffers from a flawed reading of Amchem and Ortiz. Those cases involved two sets of mutually exclusive and antagonistic claims. Every dollar that went from a limited asbestos fund to a presently-injured plaintiff was a dollar lost to a future claimant. That zero-sum antagonism was the whole predicate for the rule of those cases. In Payment Card, by contrast, there is no zero-sum equation at all; there is no antagonism between the claims. Indeed, all of the representative class plaintiffs have both claims.
133. 827 F.3d at 238 ("[A]ny merchant that operates in New York, California, or Texas (among other states that ban surcharging), or accepts American Express (whose network rules prohibit surcharging and include a most-favored nation clause) . . . [c]an get no advantage from the principal relief their counsel bargained for them."). This argument harkens back to an older approach, rejected by the 1966 framers, that no self-appointed representative could sue on behalf of a class of rights holders and obtain a preclusive judgment without class members opting in. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44 (1940) ("It is one thing to say that some members of a class may represent other members in a litigation where the sole and common interest of the class in the litigation is either to assert a common right or to challenge an asserted obligation. [] It is quite another to hold that all those who are free alternatively either to assert rights or to challenge them are of a single class, so that any group merely because it is of the class so constituted, may be deemed adequately to represent any others of the class in litigating their interests in either alternative. Such a selection of representatives for purposes of litigation, whose substantial interests are not necessarily or even probably the same as those whom they are deemed to represent, does not afford that protection to absent parties which due process requires.") (internal citations omitted). We thank David Marcus for pointing this out.
[many] merchants in the (b)(2) class are either legally or commercially unable to obtain incremental benefit from the primary relief negotiated for them by their counsel . . . . This is not a matter of certain merchants (e.g., those based in New York and those that accept American Express) arguing that class counsel did not bargain for their preferred form of relief . . . . 134 Does this suggest that, if the new (b)(2) subclass were to propose the same surcharging relief, the court would demand homogenous, separately represented subclasses comprised of merchants who operate in the states with no-surcharge statutes, or who accept American Express? It seems to. And the result is a Russian matryoshka doll of an adequacy inquiry, with nested subclasses and sub-subclasses. When a subclass presents warring preferences, the Second Circuit approach suggests the court (with the aid of objectors) might find some structural hook for narrowing the class, in an attempt to shoehorn the case into the mold of Ortiz and Amchem, where it can declare that "structural defects in this class action created a fundamental conflict."
135
But what if the real source of disharmony flows not from any structural differences at all? The objectors in Payment Card Interchange, after all, are not "unable" to benefit from the negotiated relief (e.g., because their business is limited to a state that bans surcharging). They are national merchants-e.g., Home Depot, 7-Eleven, Target-who derive varying levels of utility from the negotiated relief based on a host of factors.
The matryoshka model is ill suited for homogenizing the levels of utility that different class members can be expected to enjoy from a given set of negotiated reforms. Even a subclass comprised of merchants with operations located solely in one of the states with no-surcharge laws could quite rationally favor the same deal terms allowing for credit-card surcharging. After all, the state anti-surcharge statutes have been the ongoing subject of constitutional challenges for years-and were recently held likely unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 136 And in any event, the denizens of a nested subclass of merchants in a no- surcharge state (if there are any left) might rationally expect that the threat of surcharging in the remaining forty-eight (or however many) states will cause the nationwide interchange rates to drop, thus benefiting even the merchants in the last remaining matryoshka doll. And such a deal would especially make sense if counsel for the nested subclass shares the view that the consideration for the negotiated relief-namely, the release of certain other hypothetical claims (e.g., on the Honor All Cards and Interchange Rules) is a relatively trivial price to pay.
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In the end, (a)(4) adequacy analysis merely shuffles the problem around, from a class level to a subclass level. The same merchants are likely to have the same substantive objections to the same deal, down the road. If we are looking at ways to address those objections, we must look elsewhere.
C. The Cohesiveness Requirement
In Payment Card Interchange the objectors argued that "the far-flung mandatory (b)(2) class lacked sufficient cohesion" because the injunctive relief in the settlement "had different value to different class members."
138 They complained that settlement has "bound together, in a mandatory (b)(2) class, millions of diverse merchants with conflicting interests in both the one claim on which they were granted relief [i.e., the surcharging claim] and the vastly broader collection of claims that the settlement resolved." 141 That was the innovation of (b)(2) and its improvement upon the state of the art under equity practice, where complete harmony of interests was required. As we discussed above, the cohesiveness requirement that courts have 137. 827 F.3d at 238 ("It may be argued that the claims of the (b)(2) class are weak and can command no benefit in settlement."). 2) is nothing more than a stand-in for the manageability and superiority requirements that are explicit in (b)(3).
In the end, there is clearly no warrant for implying a requirement under (b)(2) that class member interests be homogenous or identical. Instead, courts have recognized that "each class member naturally derives different amounts of utility from any class-wide settlement" 142 and "differently weighted interests are not detrimental" to class certification " [b] ecause few people are ever identically situated." 143 If there is a doctrinal constraint on heterogeneous class member preferences, we must keep looking.
D. Rule 23(e)'s Fairness Inquiry
To whatever extent, there is at least some check against majoritarian overreach in the requirement of Rule 23(e)(2) that any settlement must be found "fair, reasonable, and adequate" if it purports to bind class members. 144 In fact, courts look at the "reaction of the class to the settlement" as a key factor in their tests for assessing whether (e)(2) has been met. 145 But the standard for finding favorable class member reaction under (e)(2) is easily met. The Second Circuit, for instance, has held "that an otherwise fair settlement should not be deemed unfair because of opposition by thirty-six percent of the total class." 146 Moreover, Rule 23(e) only applies to settlements, not trials. A settlement with deeply unpopular terms can be rejected, under (e)(2), and class members will then be free to pursue alternative, preferred remedies. But those same deeply unpopular terms may be obtained at trial, where (e)(2) has no application, and the class members will then be barred from pursuing their preferred alternative actions as a matter of res judicata.
In Payment Card Interchange, the Second Circuit could have-and frankly, should have-analyzed the relative values of the injunctive relief and the (b)(2) release under the rubric of Rule 23(e), and not under 23(a)(4). Rule 23(e) calls for a merits review, with facts on the table. The analysis under (a)(4) is entirely different: an ex ante inquiry to see if, based on the structural positioning of the parties and counsel, conflict is likely. It is an odd heuristic to apply a formal ex ante lens when realworld information is available. The Second Circuit, in essence, held that it was unacceptably likely that unitary counsel could have traded injunctive relief for money to the detriment of class members. But the relevant question should have been whether there was any detrimental trade-off in the real world. Rule 23(e) cuts through the formalism and examines the actual deal. Substantive evaluation of the value of the release under 23(e) would have required some analysis of the claims being released. Implicit in the panel opinion is that there was value in the released claims. A Rule 23(e) inquiry, by contrast, would not turn on bald presumptions. If a deal is fair and adequate, it will be approved under Rule 23(e). If not, then it will not.
E. 23(b)(2) Opt-Outs
Another potential check against majoritarian overreach is opt-out rights. In the Payment Card Interchange case, Judge Jacobs's panel decision swept aside the opt-out question, clarifying that "[w]e do not decide whether providing [(b)(2)] class members with opt-out rights would be a sufficient 'structural assurance of fair and adequate representation' . . . to overcome the lack of separate class counsel and representative."
147 Presumably, though, opt-out rights would obviate any concern about the settlement that an objector might have. 148 A different question is whether the court may allow opt-outs under (b)(2).
Courts have only ever allowed opt-outs under (b)(2) in the context of "hybrid" cases seeking nominally equitable forms of monetary relief-a line of case law that was emphatically overruled in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.
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Whether courts possess discretion to allow opt-outs in 147. 827 F.3d 223, 234 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). 148. After all, the opt-out right obviates the due process objections in damages cases under Shutts. It is hard to see how an objecting plaintiff would be injured if it were given the ability to assert its own injunctive claims in an opt-out action, or to simply retain the right to sue and not be bound by the (b)(2) release.
149. See text accompanying notes 94-97. Note, in Wal-mart itself, the Court observed that (b)(2) "provides no opportunity for . . . class members to opt out . . ." 564 U.S. 338, 362 (2011)..
